Introduction
In this paper a simple, single-level strategic game, namely the Minority Game (MG), 15 will be extended to form a hierarchical organization. The individual MGs will form a group, and individual players within each MG will make decisions which depend on 17 the average behavior of their own and other MGs. Calculations show that under certain conditions the elements of the individual MGs "know" much more about each other 19 than one would expect.
: : :Hierarchical organization is a common way to structure a group of people, where 21 members chie y communicate with their immediate superior and with their immediate subordinates. Structuring organizations in this way is useful partly because 23 it can reduce the communication overhead [1] .
One of the most interesting questions in the theory of hierarchical systems is how 25 much information a subsystem has about the performance of the whole. In addition to 
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study this problem the top-down in uence of the "whole system" to the elements will 1 also be quantitatively studied.
Hierarchical extension of MG 3
MG is a simple model of inductively rational systems [2] . This game is a system of N interacting agents. Each agent brings a decision a i (s i (t), (t)) between +1 and 5 −1 based on her s i (t) strategy and the knowledge of the history of the game (t). In all simulations each agent chooses from one of two strategies which are randomly 7 chosen for each agent in the beginning of the game. A strategy is a look-up table which assigns the actual choice to the M component vector (t) of the previous M outcome 9 signs, sgn(A(t)). A(t) is deÿned as A(t) = i a i (s i (t); (t)). Each agent chooses the sth strategy from the possible ones with probability 11
where Z
−1 i
= s e i U is (t) , i is the inverse temperature, and the performance of the ith agent's sth strategy is evaluated by a cumulative score U is (t). The updating rule 13 for the evaluation:
The second term represents the gain of the individual agents. 15
The original model is extended to form a hierarchical structure. This extension is done in the following way. agents play and where their decision is a ij (s ij (t); j (t)). We use j since each local MGs history contains the local and global minority sign hence it is di erent for every 21 local MG. For simplicity we will denote a ij (s i (t); j (t)) by a ij (t).
In each low level MG we have an outcome minority sign, −sgn(A j ). From the set 23 of these signs a global sum and a minority sign, is deÿned as A = j sgn(A j ) and −sgn(A). Thus the score updating dynamics of the strategies are modiÿed as 25
The constant, C, expresses the ratio of the contribution of the local and global environments. The local environment consists of the agents playing in the original MG, 27 while the global one is derived from the connection of the MGs. The game among the MGs, however, di ers from the original. The MGs, as individual agents, do not have 29 strategies and memories explicitly. Instead the global connection between the MGs is made only through their low level agents. 31
When C → 0 we obtain the original deÿnition. It is often assumed in the theory of hierarchical structures that the local interactions should be much stronger than the 33 global ones [3] . However, the violation of this assumption implies non-trivial results. In the context of MG for values of C when the global interactions are stronger than 1 the local ones, the agents do not choose a strategy to maximize their own winning chance only, but also to help their whole group win against other groups.
3
To be able to analyze our extended multilevel model, we will decompose it into three subsystems. Each subsystem contains binary interlayer interactions only, as shown in 5 Fig. 1 . The characteristic quantities, namely the global e ciency and the degree of symmetry, will be properly redeÿned. 7
Results

Interactions between the elementary and intermediate levels 9
The new additive part of Eq. (3) is the same for every elementary participant, therefore we expect that the normalized global "waste" By this extension, however, the total payo of the jth MG u j = −A 2 j − A j A might be greater than zero, and thus it is no longer a "negative sum game". 15 Fig. 2 shows the results of the comparative studies between the original and the special features of the extended game by calculating 2 j using the equation 17 (left) and C (right), respectively. The asymmetry is deÿned by
where −sgn(A j (t))| j is the conditional probability of −sgn(A j (t)) conditioned 17 on j .
Our numerical results show that the system nowhere became symmetrical for 19 the two signs. Indeed in Fig. 3 we can see that for various Cs and N s we obtain the same characteristics re ecting that there is no phase transition in the system with 21 the parameters we investigated. The tendency of the change occurs more slowly than in the original game. The di erence appears because our subsystems are not closed 23 because of the interaction between the MGs. Though there exists an 'optimal strategy' where the symmetrical phase should appear, its e ciency is very low. 25 
Interactions between the middle and upper levels 1
Our naive expectation is to ÿnd 'random players,' i.e., players who select their strategies randomly, because the choices of the middle level players are just the results 3 of minority games of the lower level. These 'choices' cannot be interpreted as the results of 'decisions' because the middle level does not have any direct memories 5 or strategies. They are only mean ÿeld averages over the individual MGs. Although the lack of memory implies the break down of the deÿnition of the original scaled 7 parameter, N , we still found this quantity to be useful. We deÿne the waste 2 mu in terms of the variation in each of the middle level games 9 (mu is the symbolic notation of "between middle and upper"). Explicitly, we have
Note that the last term of Eq. (6) depends on N . The lack of normalization will not 11 have any e ect, because we are only interested in the sign of the sum of the local agents' performance. 13
The simulation results re ect the expectations discussed above. For those values of C which implement larger local connections within an MG than to the global one 15 (C =1=N ) the system shows random behavior (Fig. 4 left) . When the global connection gets stronger, i.e., C=1, the system shows an emergent coordination [4] , i.e., the system 17 as a whole shows a di erent than random performance. Fig. 4 (right) shows positive and not negative deviation from the random performance. This phenomenon is the 19 result of the interaction of the two minority games.
Interactions between the elementary and upper levels 21
In this case we could ask whether there is any direct connection between the elementary and upper levels. Here we calculated di erent globally averaged functions 23 
First, we note that there is now another scaled parameter. For P eu =(2 M=2 ) N +1 possible 3 states of the system the new scaled parameter is N; N = P eu =NN . And refers to the state of the whole system (i.e.,
In these numerical simulations ( Another interesting result of our investigation is the symmetry at this level. One might believe that Â 2 eu would not depend on either N or C, explicitly. However, the 9 simulation result (Fig. 6 ) still shows some dependence on N and C. 
Discussion 1
We studied a hierarchical extension of the MG for three levels and studied the inter-level interactions. First, the local MGs, i.e., the connections between the lower 3 and middle layers were studied. It was interesting to see that for the ratio C = 1 the global e ciency depends on the number of individual MGs. By using this 5 formula the individual agents know the number of all MGs. In addition, at least in a broad region of the parameters, the degree of symmetry is never zero. Consequently, 7 in contrast to the original game, there always exists an optimal strategy for winning the game. 9
Second, the connections between the intermediate and the upper levels were investigated. For the case of relatively strong local connections, the system seems to behave 11 randomly. For strong global coupling the behavior deviates from random behavior, and shows a self-organized global behavior, which can be considered a special type of 13 'emergent coordination'. Finally, the results of the study of the connections between the lower and the 15 upper level also exhibits the property seen previously: for the case of C = 1 the global e ciency depends on the number of games. In addition, the global e ciency 17 shows interesting dependences both on the values of the ratio number, and on the number of games. In the future we intend to investigate these dependences 19 analytically. 
